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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is an appeal from a final Order dated January 15, 
1993, wherein the lower court denied Defendant/Appellant's 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court err in denying Defendant/ 
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment that had been 
entered without notice to Century? In addressing the issue, 
the Appellate Court will review the lower court's decision for 
correctness and accord no particular deference to the decision 
of the lower court. Aliva v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20 (Utah 1990). 
The authorities cited by Defendant /Appellant on this issue are 
as follows: Rule 5(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 
55(a), (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Russell v. Martell, 
681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984); P & B Land, Inc. v. Klunaervick, 
751 P.2d 274 (Utah App. 1988); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 
1207 (Utah 1983); Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978); 
Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984). 
2. Did the lower court err in concluding that 
Defendant/Appellant failed to timely file its Motion to Set 
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Aside Default Judgment? In addressing the issue, the 
Appellate Court will review the lower court's decision for 
correctness and accord no particular deference to the decision 
of the lower court. Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D. T. 
Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1992). The 
authorities cited by Defendant/Appellant on this issue are as 
follows: Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 
58A(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Bish's Sheet Metal Co. 
v. Luras, 359 P.2d 21 (Utah 1961); Blackhurst v. Transamerica 
Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985); Mendez v. State, 813 P.2d 
1234 (Utah App. 1991); Workman v. Naale Construction, Inc., 
802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990) McKean v. Mountain View Memorial 
Estates, Inc.. 411 P.2d 129 (Utah 1966); Dudley v. Keller, 521 
P.2d 175 (Colo.App. 1974); Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 
P.2d 189 (Utah 1962); Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Aala Dev. 
Corp.. 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). 
3. Did the lower court err in denying Defendant/ 
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on grounds 
that Defendant/Appellant had failed to present meritorious 
defenses? In addressing the issue, the Appellate Court will 
review the lower court's decision for correctness and accord 
no particular deference to the decision of the lower court. 
Scaharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Gravson 
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Ropper Ltd, v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989). The 
authorities cited by Defendant/Appellant on this issue are as 
follows: Boston Acme Mines Dev. Co. v. Clawson, 240 Pac. 165 
(Utah 1925); Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636 
(Utah 1980); Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982); 
Hoaaan & Hall & Hiaains, Inc. v. Hall, 414 P.2d 89 (Utah 
1966); Berrv v. Slagle, 431 P.2d 575 (Utah 1967); Jones Mining 
Company v. Cardiff Mining & Milling Company, 191 Pac. 426 
(Utah 1920); Davis v. Heath Dev. Co., 558 P.2d 594 (Utah 
1976); Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 236 
Pac. 231 (Utah 1931). 
4. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in denying 
Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment? 
If the lower court made no erroneous legal conclusions with 
respect to construction of the Rules of Procedure or the legal 
sufficiency of anticipated defenses (see cases cited above), 
the lower court is afforded broad discretion and the Appellate 
Court will reverse only for abuse of discretion. Birch v. 
Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). The authorities cited 
by Defendant/Appellant on this issue are as follows: Workman 
v. Naole Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990) 
Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 359 P.2d 21 (Utah 1961); 
Dudley v. Keller, 521 P.2d 175 (Colo.App. 1974) Heloesen v. 
3 
Invanaumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Defendant/Appellant does not contend any authorities are 
determinative of any issue involved in the appeal. However, 
the following Rules of Procedure are central to the issues to 
be considered by this appeal: Rule 5(a), (b) U.R.C.P. 
(attached as Addendum Exhibit "E"); Rule 55(a), (b) U.R.C.P. 
(attached as Addendum Exhibit "F"); Rule 58A(d) U.R.C.P. 
(attached as Addendum Exhibit "G"); and, Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. 
(attached as Addendum Exhibit "H"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In addressing the issues raised by this appeal, 
Plaintiff/Appellee Lowell E. Potter will be referred to as 
"Potter11 and Defendant/Appellant Century 21 Mining Company 
will be referred to as "Century." 
On or about September 13, 1988, Potter commenced this 
action by the filing of a Verified Complaint. (R. 2-6). In 
Count III of the Complaint, Potter sought to enforce a 
promissory note which he alleged was dated February 28, 1986, 
in the principal sum of $90,000. (R. 2-5). In Count IV of 
4 
the Complaint, Potter alleged that the Note "was to secure a 
purchase price of five million (5,000,000) shares of Century 
21 stock" and Potter sought recision of the Promissory Note 
(R. 4). The other allegations of the Complaint have little 
relevance to the issues involved on appeal.1 
Century's prior attorney, Nathan Drage, was justifiably 
confused as to the purpose for the commencement of the instant 
action by reason of unorthodox procedures and the pendency of 
previously filed litigation which asserted the same claim. In 
an attempt to resolve the confusion, the matter was discussed 
between counsel for Potter and Century, and Century's attorney 
was informed that no further action would be taken in the 
matter without further notice. In reliance on this 
representation, counsel for Century did not file an answer to 
the Complaint. 
On December 2, 1988, contrary to the prior representation 
of Potter's attorney and without notice to Century or its 
attorney, Potter obtained a Default Judgment against Century 
(R. 21-22, Addendum Exhibit "B"). Thereafter, the existence 
Count I of the Verified Complaint alleged that Defendant had wrongfully refused to honor stock 
certificate 11391 issued by Century (R. 2-3). Count II asserted clains relating to such refusal. In this 
regard, discovery in a subsequent case entitled "Lowell E. Potter, Plaintiff v. TV Communications Network, Inc., 
et al., Defendants" Civil No. 920905554, pending in the Third Judicial District Court, has established that 
certificate 11391 was later submitted and honored by the transfer agent. Thus, the issues relating to Counts 
I and II are now moot. 
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of the Judgment was not disclosed by Potter to Century or its 
attorney. 
When Century's prior attorney learned of the Judgment 
from a third party in December, 1989, he filed a Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment. On January 15, 1993, the lower court entered 
an Order denying Century's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment (R. 94-95, Addendum Exhibit "D"). The Order of 
January 15, 1993, denying Century's Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment, is the subject of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
On March 18, 1987, Potter commenced an action against 
Century alleging Century was "indebted" to Potter in the sum 
of $110,000 (hereinafter "1987 action") (R. 43). On June 2, 
1987, Century filed an Answer to the Complaint in the 1987 
action denying liability for the "indebtedness" (R. 44). 
Apparently unwilling to subject his claims to the scrutiny of 
litigation, Potter abandoned prosecution of the 1987 action.2 
On September 13, 1988, while the 1987 action was still 
pending, Potter commenced the instant action asserting the 
On May 31, 1989, the 1987 action was dismissed for Lack of prosecution (R. 46). 
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same claims that had been asserted in the 1987 action.3 On 
the same date that the instant action was filed, Potter 
obtained an Order to Show Cause requiring Defendants to appear 
and show cause why the relief demanded in Count I of the 
Complaint should not be granted. The Order to Show Cause was 
originally prepared to reflect a hearing date in September, 
but was apparently changed after execution by the Court to 
show a hearing date of November 2, 1988 (R. 6). 
The Order to Show Cause was the equivalent of a motion 
for summary judgment with respect to Count I of the Verified 
Complaint and was apparently characterized as an Order to Show 
Cause in order to circumvent the 20-day restriction relating 
to summary judgments filed by Plaintiffs imposed by Rule 
56(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.4 
Despite the fact the Complaint was filed on September 13, 
1988, and the Order to Show Cause entered on the same date, 
the Complaint and Order to Show Cause were not delivered to 
The Promissory Note which is the subject of the instant action was in existence on the date 
of the filing of the 1987 action and the principal and accrued interest (18% per annum) on the date of the 
filing of the Complaint in the 1987 action ($107,000) was approximately the same as the demand for relief stated 
in the 1987 action ($110,000). Although the allegations of the 1987 action are brief and incomplete, it is 
apparent that the demand for $3,000 in excess of principal and accrued interest was attributable to costs and/or 
attorney's fees. 
4 
The original Order to Show Cause noted a hearing date in September, 1988 (R. 6). The Order 
to Show Cause was later changed by interlineation to November 2, 1988 (Ibid). 
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the sheriff for service on Century until October 20, 1988 (R. 
8-9, 10-12) apparently to reduce Century's preparation time. 
Service of the Complaint and Order to Show Cause was not 
accomplished until October 24, 1988 (R. 8-9, 10-12). Service 
was made on Leonard Nielson, registered agent for Century 21 
(Ibid). The registered agent mailed the Summons, Complaint 
and Order to Show Cause to Century's attorney Ronald L. Vance 
on October 28, 1988 (R. 48). 
The documents were received by Ronald L. Vance and his 
associate, Nathan Drage, on October 30, 1988 (Drage Affidavit, 
para. 2, R. 50) only three days before the scheduled hearing 
stated in the amended Order to Show Cause (Drage Affidavit, 
para. 2, R. 50). Upon observing the unorthodox procedure, the 
suspicious interlineation changes on the Order to Show Cause 
and the inadequate Notice of Hearing on the dispositive 
"motion," Drage immediately contacted the court clerk to 
determine the legitimacy of the hearing date (Drage Affidavit, 
para. 6, R. 51). Drage was informed by the clerk that no such 
hearing had been scheduled on the court's calendar (Ibid). 
Immediately after the telephone conversation with the 
court clerk, Drage telephoned Potter's attorney, Richard 
Leedy, to express his confusion arising from the unorthodox 
procedure, the interlineation change on the hearing date, the 
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absence of a hearing date on the court's calendar and the 
purpose in filing the litigation in light of the pendency of 
the 1987 action asserting the same claim. At that time, 
attorney Leedy informed Drage that Drage need not take any 
further action in the matter without further notice (Drage 
Affidavit, para, 7, R. 51).5 
It was apparent that on and after Novemoer 1, 1988, 
Potter's attorney, Richard Leedy, was fully aware that Ronald 
Vance and/or his associate, Nathan Drage, had been engaged by 
Century to defend the instant action as well as the 1987 
action asserting the same indebtedness claim.6 
On November 4, 1988, only three days after attorney Leedy 
had represented that no further action would be taken without 
notice to Drage, Leedy filed a Notice of Hearing stating that 
hearing on the Order to Show Cause would be held on December 
2, 1988 (R. 19). Contrary to the express representation made 
to Drage only three days earlier, a copy of the Notice was not 
sent or delivered to Century or its attorneys. The Mailing 
Certificate on the Notice of Hearing made no mention of 
In his Affidavit dated Hay 21, 1990, attorney Leedy did not deny his representation to attorney 
Orage that no further action would be taken without further notice (Affidavit of Richard Leedy, para. 3, R. 70-
70A). Leedy merely stated he had "no independent recollection of the conversation and/or stipulation" (Ibid). 
Ronald Vance filed an answer to the Complaint in the 1987 action on June 2, 1987 (R. 44). 
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Century or its attorney (R. 19) and Drage confirmed that he 
received no notice of the hearing (Drage Affidavit, para. 11, 
R. 52). On the date the Notice of Hearing was filed, Century 
was not in default. On the contrary, on the date of the 
Notice of Hearing, the time permitted to answer the Complaint 
had not yet expired. Thus, Century was entitled to receive 
notice of the hearing. 
Inasmuch as Drage received no notice of the hearing 
scheduled for December 2, 1988, the hearing proceeded without 
participation of Century or its attorney, Nathan Drage 
(R. 21). During the course of the hearing, attorney Leedy, on 
behalf of Potter, apparently noted Century's failure to answer 
the Complaint and moved for entry of default judgment (R. 21). 
There is disturbing evidence that Potter's counsel may have 
represented to the court at the hearing that Century had 
stipulated to the entry of a default judgment. The Minute 
Entry prepared by the court stated: "Based on Pltf's Motion to 
Default Deft's and stipulation of respective counsel, the 
court hereby grants the motions." (Emphasis added) (R. 20, 
Addendum Exhibit "A"). The lower court granted Potter•s 
motion and entered Century's default and ordered a default 
judgment against Century in the sum of $90,000 together with 
interest at the rate of 18% per annum and attorney's fees in 
10 
the sum of $1,500 (Ibid). 
After the entry of the Judgment, the existence of the 
Judgment was concealed. At no time did Potter provide Century 
notice of the entry of the judgment.7 Nathan Drage, attorney 
for Century, first learned of the existence of the Judgment 
from a third party in December, 1989 (Drage Affidavit, para. 
11, R. 52). 
After learning of the existence of the Judgment, attorney 
Drage, on behalf of Century, filed a Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment (R. 23-24) with an accompanying Memorandum 
(R. 26-41), supporting Affidavits (R. 50-52; 55; 58-60) and 
other supporting documents. (See R. 57). 
The Memorandum and affidavits submitted by Century in 
support of its Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
established the existence of meritorious defenses. Century 
provided documentation showing clear evidence of self-dealing 
and related failure of consideration for the Promissory Note. 
In this regard, Potter and his son, Thomas Potter, constituted 
two of the three members of Century's Board of Directors at 
the time Century purportedly "approved" the $90,000 debt to 
Potter. The resolution purporting to approve Century's 
The file contains no notice of entry of judgment as required by Rule 58A(d). U.R.C.P. 
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obligation was signed only by Potter and his son (R. 57). The 
third Board member's signature is conspicuously absent from 
the resolution (Ibid). Furthermore, the Promissory Note was 
executed in consideration for the purchase of 5,000,000 shares 
of Century stock held by Potter (Verified Complaint, para. 19, 
R. 4; R. 57). After receiving the Promissory Note, Potter 
failed and refused to deliver the 5,000,000 shares of Century 
stock (R. 55, 30). The transactions described in the 
resolution, Potter's involvement in voting on a resolution for 
his own benefit and Potter's conduct after the resolution, 
establish the existence of the defenses of breach of fiduciary 
duties and failure of consideration. 
On the basis of these facts, Century has justiciable 
defenses including breach of fiduciary duty; lack of 
consideration; and, absence of valid corporate authorization 
for the indebtedness. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. On November 4, 1988, Potter filed a notice of 
a hearing to be held before the lower court on December 2, 
1988. On the date the notice was filed, the time permitted 
for Century to file its answer to the Complaint had not yet 
expired. Thus, Century was not in default and entitled to 
12 
notice of all hearings. Despite the fact that Potter's 
attorney was fully aware of the identity of Century's 
registered agent and attorneys, Potter did not serve notice of 
the hearing on Century or its attorneys and the hearing 
proceeded in Century's absence. During the course of the 
hearing in the absence of Century and its attorney, Potter 
obtained a default judgment against Century. The default 
judgment was obtained in violation of the due process 
procedures specified in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
which require notice of hearing in this circumstance. The 
lower court erred in refusing to set aside the default 
judgment obtained in violation of due process procedures. 
Point II. Century's Motion To Set Aside Default was 
based, in part, on Potter's failure to comply with the due 
process procedures of adequate notice. Such grounds fall 
within the provisions of Rule 60(b)(7), U.R.C.P., which are 
not subject to a three-month filing restriction. The lower 
court erred in denying Century's Motion To Set Aside Default 
on the ground it was not filed within the three-month period. 
On the basis of the facts and circumstances, including 
Potter's abandonment of a prior action on the same claim and 
concealment of the judgment in the instant case, Century's 
Motion To Set Aside Default was timely filed. 
13 
Point III. By reason of Potter's status as a director of 
Century and his involvement in the corporate resolution 
purporting to authorize Century's indebtedness to Potter, the 
Promissory Note is void. Furthermore, Potter failed to 
deliver the consideration for the Promissory Note. In such 
circumstances, the lower court erred in concluding that 
Century had not demonstrated the existence of meritorious 
defenses. 
Point IV. The default judgment was obtained on the basis 
of representations on the part of Potter's attorney and other 
actions expressly designed to induce Century's attorney to 
delay filing an answer or otherwise defending against the 
allegations of the Complaint. In such circumstances, the 
lower court abused its discretion by denying Century's Motion 
To Set Aside Default Judgment thereby allowing Potter to 
benefit by his deception and the violation of Century's 
procedural rights. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING CENTURY'S MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED WHICH WAS WITHOUT 
NOTICE TO CENTURY IN VIOLATION OF RULE 5(a), U.R.C.P. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, on November 4, 1988, 
Potter prepared and filed a Notice of Hearing to be held on 
14 
December 2, 1988. It is undisputed that Potter did not serve 
a copy of the notice on Century or its attorney.8 During the 
course of the hearing on December 2, 1988, the default 
judgment was entered against Century. 
On the date the Notice of Hearing was filed, Century had 
not filed an answer to the Complaint. However, on the date 
the Notice of Hearing was filed, the time permitted for 
answering the Complaint had not expired.9 Thus, Century was 
entitled to notice of the hearing on December 2, 1988. Rule 
5(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
At no time prior to the hearing on December 2, 1988, 
including the period after Century's answer became due, was 
Century's default entered in accordance with Rule 55(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, at all times prior to the 
hearing on December 2, 1988, Century was entitled to notice of 
all proceedings in the litigation. Rule 55(a)(2), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure.10 
o 
The Notice of Hearing did not include Century or its attorney on the mailing certificate (R. 
19) and attorney Drage confirmed the absence of notice (Drage Affidavit, para. 11, R. 52). 
The Summons and Complaint were served on October 24, 1988 (R. 10-12). Thus, an answer was not 
due until November 13, 1988, nine days after the Notice of Hearing was filed. 
A litigant is released from an obligation to give opposing parties notice only "after the entry 
of the default of any party, as provided in subdivision (a)(1) of this Rule ..." Rule 55(a)(2), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Century's default was not entered until December 2, 1988, immediately before entry of the 
default judgment (R. 21). 
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During the course of the scheduled hearing on December 2, 
1988, the default of Defendant was first entered 
simultaneously with entry of the default judgment. At all 
times prior thereto, Century was entitled to notice of any 
proceedings. Rule 5(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 
55(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It is readily apparent 
that if the required notice had been given, the default 
judgment would not have been entered. The notice would have 
advised Century that Potter's counsel misrepresented his 
intentions and had reneged on the stipulation thereby 
prompting Century to file an answer and otherwise protect its 
interests. Furthermore, if Potter's counsel falsely 
represented Century had stipulated to the default11, the 
notice would have allowed Century to be present to deny the 
existence of the stipulation. 
At the time of the entry of the default judgment, the 
court file clearly reflected that the Notice of Hearing had 
been filed before Century's answer was due and that Century 
had not received notice of the hearing. Century's absence 
from the hearing should have prompted some inquiry by the 
11 
As previously noted, the wording of the court's Minute Entry arising out of the December 2, 
1988, hearing indicates Potter's attorney nay have represented to the court that Century had stipulated to the 
default (R. 20, Appendix Exhibit "A"). 
16 
lower court as to the reason therefore.12 
Parties in default retain some procedural rights as 
stated in the Rules of Civil Procedure. Russell v. Martell, 
681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). It follows with greater force that 
parties not in default under Rule 55(a) are entitled to the 
procedural rights stated in the Rules of Procedure. 
The failure of the lower court to demand compliance with 
the procedural provisions of the Rules of Procedure compels 
reversal of the judgment which was entered in violation of the 
Rules. P & B Land, Inc. v. Klunaervick, 751 P.2d 274 (Utah 
App. 1988); Russell v. Martell. 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). 
The failure of Potter to provide Century with Notice of 
Hearing on December 2, 1988, goes beyond violation of the 
Rules of Procedure. The matter involves violation of basic 
concepts of fairness and due process of law. In Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
held: 
Timely and adequate notice and 
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful 
way are the very heart of procedural 
fairness . . . . 
The lower court apparently failed to observe that the Notice of Hearing was filed prior to the 
time Century's answer was due. In its Minute Entry, the court stated: "In this circumstance there is no 
obligation under the rules or the statutes for a party taking the default to give notice thereof to the 
opposition" (R. 91, Addendum, Exhibit "C"). 
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An elementary and fundamental requirement 
of due process in any proceeding which is 
to be accorded finality is notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections. The notice must be of 
such nature as reasonably to convey the 
required information, and it must afford 
a reasonable time for those interested to 
make their appearance. 
Many cases have held that where notice is 
ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party 
of the nature of the proceedings against 
him or not given sufficiently in advance 
of the proceeding to permit preparation, 
a party is deprived of due process. 
Accord, Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 
(Utah 1978); Wells v. Children's Aid 
Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984). 
By reason of the apparent intentional failure of Potter 
to provide Century with notice of hearing wherein the default 
judgment was entered, in clear violation of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure and basic concepts of due process, the order of the 
trial court should be reversed and the default judgment should 
be set aside. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING CENTURY'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS UNTIMELY FILED 
In its Minute Entry dated January 13, 1993, the lower 
court considered Century's Rule 60(b) motion as based solely 
on "excusable neglect" and denied the motion as untimely 
18 
(R. 91, Addendum Exhibit "C"). In this regard, a motion under 
Rule 60(b)(1) ("Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise and Excusable 
Neglect") must be filed "not more than three months after the 
judgment . . . was entered," 
The ruling by the lower court was clearly erroneous. 
Century's Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment was not limited 
to excusable neglect. On the contrary, paragraph 4 of the 
Motion also asserted: "Counsel for Plaintiff took a default 
judgment against Century 21 Mining without notice to Century 
21 Mining or its counsel resulting in a lack of due process of 
law." (R. 24). The facts supporting this ground for vacating 
the default judgment are considered in Point I, supra. 
It is established that a motion under Rule 60(b), 
asserting failure of due process, falls within subdivision 7 
of Rule 60, i.e., "any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment." Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 
359 P.2d 21 (Utah 1961). Rule 60(b)(7) is not subject to the 
three month time limitation imposed by the lower court. Thus, 
the imposition of time constraints relating to "excusable 
neglect" was erroneous and imposed time limitations upon 
Century not stated in Rule 60(b). 
Admittedly, Century's prior attorney did not file the 
motion until February 26, 1990, more than 14 months after the 
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judgment was entered. However, under the circumstances of the 
case, it is respectfully submitted that such delay was not 
unreasonable. It is undisputed that counsel for Potter 
expressly represented to Century's prior counsel that no 
further action would be taken in the matter without further 
notice. In this regard, the continued absence of any further 
notice for an extended period, including a period of 14 
months, was not an unusual circumstance in this case. On the 
contrary, in the 1987 action Potter took no action on the same 
claim for a period of 26 months.13 
Potter's involvement in Century's delay in filing its 
Rule 60(b) motion is not limited to the false representation 
of Potter's counsel and Potter's established practice of 
abandoning the claim after it was filed. In addition to these 
factors, Potter failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 
58A(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide: 
The prevailing party shall promptly give 
notice of the signing or entry of 
judgment to all other parties and shall 
file proof of service of such notice with 
the clerk of the court. However, the 
time for filing a notice of appeal is not 
affected by the notice requirement of 
this provision. 
The 1987 action was commenced on March 18, 1987 (R. 43) and was dismissed for failure to 
prosecute on May 31, 1989 (R. 46), a period of 26 months. 
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Century's failure to file its Motion under Rule 60(b)(7) 
for a period of 14 months is not unreasonable in the 
circumstances of this case. In Workman v. Naale Construction, 
Inc. , 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990), this Court held that a 
delay of more than one year in filing a motion under Rule 
60(b)(5)-(7) was not unreasonable where the plaintiff had 
failed to give notice of the entry of the judgment pursuant to 
Rule 58A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It follows with 
greater force that failure of both pre-judgment and post-
judgement notice excuses delay in filing a motion under Rule 
60(b)(7). 
If anything is established by the record, it is that 
Potter was the primary force in inducing Century's delay in 
filing its motion under Rule 60(b). The combined effect of 
the false representation that no further action would be taken 
without notice; the failure to serve notice of the hearing on 
December 2, 1989; the prior abandonment of the same claim in 
the 1987 action; and, the failure to give notice of the 
judgment pursuant to Rule 58A(d) should be weighed against 
Century's only contribution to the delay, i.e., continuing 
good faith reliance on the representation and stipulation of 
Potter's attorney. 
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In such circumstance, the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
should be imposed by the Court to prevent Potter from 
benefitting from the misrepresentations of his attorney and 
delay which he induced. Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 
699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985); Mendez v. State, 813 P.2d 1234 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
To the extent that Century's prior attorney's delay is 
deemed unreasonable, Century should not be subjected to an 
unjust judgment to which it has meritorious defenses merely by 
reason of the neglect of its attorney to whom it entrusted to 
represent its interests in the matter. McKean v. Mountain 
View Memorial Estates, Inc.. 411 P.2d 129 (Utah 1966).; Dudley 
v. Keller, 521 P.2d 175 (Colo.App. 1974). Moreover, default 
judgments are not favored by the courts and are not in the 
interest of justice and fair play. Heathman v. Fabian & 
Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189 (Utah 1962). Any doubt as to the 
reasonableness of the filing should be resolved in favor of 
setting aside the default judgment. Interstate Excavating, 
Inc. v. Aala Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). 
On the basis of the foregoing, the order of the lower 
court denying Century's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
should be reversed. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING CENTURY HAD NOT 
DEMONSTRATED THE EXISTENCE OF MERITORIOUS DEFENSES 
In its Minute Entry of January 13, 1993, one of the 
stated grounds for denying Century's Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment was that Century had not shown that it had 
meritorious defenses (R. 91, Addendum Exhibit "C"). 
This ruling by the lower court was clearly erroneous. In 
this regard, attached to Century's memorandum filed in support 
of its Motion, was a copy of the Minutes of the Board of 
Directors purporting to approve the $90,000 indebtedness of 
Century in favor of Potter (R. 57) (hereinafter "Minutes"). 
The Minutes establish that at the time of the corporate 
"authorization" for the $90,000 indebtedness, Potter and his 
son, Thomas Potter, comprised two of the three members of 
Century's Board of Directors. Thus, there was obvious self-
dealing and serious questions of breach of fiduciary duties. 
The Minutes involved a "special Board of Directors 
meeting" conducted in the absence of the third director, John 
L. Anderson. Mr. Anderson was the only director that did not 
have a personal interest in the matter. Although the Minutes 
recite that notice of the meeting was waived, John L. Anderson 
did not sign the Minutes and no signed waiver of notice has 
ever been produced. Anderson has confirmed to Century that he 
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received no notice of the meeting (R. 59). Furthermore, the 
Minutes expressly acknowledge the obvious conflict of interest 
which was openly ignored by Potter's participation in the 
self-serving "authorization" for indebtedness in his favor at 
the expense of the corporation. 
The Promissory Note was executed by Century as 
consideration for the purchase*of 5,000,000 shares of Century 
stock.14 (Verified Complaint, para. 19, R. 4; R. 57). After 
receiving the Promissory Note, Potter refused to deliver the 
5,000,000 shares (R. 55, 30). 
These circumstances demonstrate the existence of 
meritorious defenses. In this regard, the absence of notice 
to all directors of a special meeting of the Board renders the 
Board action void. Boston Acme Mines Dev. Co. v. Clawson, 240 
Pac. 165 (Utah 1925). Furthermore, a director has a fiduciary 
duty to the corporation. Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp.. 
614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980); Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727 
(Utah 1982); Hoaaan & Hall & Hiaains, Inc. v. Hall, 414 P.2d 
89 (Utah 1966); Berrv v. Slaale. 431 P.2d 575 (Utah 1967); 
Jones Mining Company v. Cardiff Mining & Milling Company, 191 
Pac. 426 (Utah 1920). This duty requires the director to 
It was contemplated that the stock would be received by Century as treasury stock and 
thereafter delivered to Raymond Naylor as consideration for the purchase of a mining property (R. 55). 
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subordinate his personal interests to the interests of the 
corporation. Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982); 
Hoggan & Hall & Higgins, Inc. v. Hall, 414 P.2d 89 (Utah 
1966). 
Of greatest significance is the fact that Potter's 
participation in the corporate resolution purporting to 
authorize Century's execution of the Promissory Note renders 
the Promissory Note void. In Davis v. Heath Dev. Co., 558 
P.2d 594 (Utah 1976), the Supreme Court held: 
. . . Any director who has an interest in 
a proposed transaction with the 
corporation cannot participate in such 
business to bind the corporation, either 
to make up a quorum, or to vote on the 
proposal. . . . The well established rule 
is that in such circumstances, where its 
officers deal with the corporation in 
their own interest, that as to them the 
contract is void, or at best voidable at 
the option of the corporation. 
The transactions described in the Minutes further suggest 
a failure of consideration, i.e., Potter obtained a receivable 
of $90,000 for 5,000,000 shares of his stock and then received 
4,800,000 shares in addition to the $90,000 (R. 57). 
Thereafter, Potter refused to deliver the 5,000,000 shares 
that gave rise to the execution of the Promissory Note (R. 55, 
30). 
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A corporate director has the burden to establish good 
faith in his dealings with the corporation. Glen Allen Mining 
Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 236 Pac. 231 (Utah 1931). 
Under the circumstances noted herein, Potter should be 
compelled to demonstrate his good faith at a trial on the 
merits. 
On the basis of the facts above described, it is 
respectfully submitted that the lower court erred in 
concluding that Century had failed to demonstrate the 
existence of meritorious defenses. For this reason, the order 
of the lower court denying Century's Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment should be reversed. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
CENTURY^ MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Century respectfully submits that by reason of the errors 
in law noted in Points I - III, the issue of abuse of 
discretion is moot. See Workman v. Nagle Construction, Inc., 
802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990); Bish's Sheet Metal Company v. 
Luras, 359 P.2d 21 (Utah 1961); Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. 
Smith, 785 P.2d 682 (Idaho App. 1990). However, if the Court 
determines that the discretion of the lower court should be 
reviewed in this matter, Century submits that the facts and 
circumstances of this case compel the conclusion that the 
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lower court abused its discretion in denying Century's Motion 
to Set Aside Default Judgment. 
As noted in this brief, the misrepresentations of 
Potter's attorney was a controlling factor in inducing 
Century's counsel to refrain from timely filing an appropriate 
response to the Complaint. Century's attorney's continued 
reliance upon the representations of Potter' s attorney was not 
unreasonable in light of Potter's prior abandonment of the 
same claim in the 1987 action which extended for a period of 
26 months. 
The default judgment was the direct consequence of an 
apparent deliberate attempt to deprive Century of notice of 
the hearing wherein the default judgment was entered. The 
failure of such notice constituted a clear violation of the 
due process procedure specified in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The suspicious circumstances under which the indebtedness 
to Potter arose and Potter's failure to deliver the 
consideration for the Promissory Note (noted in Point III), 
provided Potter with a compelling incentive to avoid scrutiny 
as to the legitimacy and enforceability of the indebtedness 
which he claimed was owing to him by Century. The record 
before the lower court demonstrated that Potter intended to 
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use every means ranging from fraudulent misrepresentations to 
blatant violations of procedural rights to avoid such 
scrutiny. In this regard, when Century filed its answer in 
the 1987 litigation, thereby subjecting Potter's claims to the 
possibility of scrutiny in the litigation process, Potter 
abandoned further prosecution taking no action for a period of 
26 months. When the instant litigation was commenced, all 
efforts were focused on preventing the filing of an answer and 
avoiding any procedure which would result in any investigation 
or scrutiny of Potter's claims. 
Potter should not be permitted to benefit by the 
deception and violation of procedural rules that pervade every 
aspect of this case. 
It has been held that where a plaintiff is fully aware 
that defendant intends to appear and defend the action15; the 
identity of defendant' s representatives are known to plaintiff 
through communications regarding the issues in the action, an 
extension to answer has been implied by said communications; 
and, plaintiff thereafter takes a default judgment without 
notice to plaintiff or his representatives, it is an abuse of 
discretion to deny defendant' s motion to set aside the default 
This fact is established not only by attorney Drage's telephone communication with opposing 
counsel shortly after service of summons in the instant action (Drage Affidavit, para. 7, R. 51), but also by 
the filing of an answer denying the same claim in the 1987 action by Drage's associate, Ronald Vance (R. 44). 
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judgment. Helaesen v. Invanaumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981). 
It is respectfully submitted that the circumstances involved 
in the instant case, where an express agreement for an 
extension to answer was knowingly breached, the holding of the 
Helaesen case applies with greater force. 
The order denying Century's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment clearly extends these unjust benefits to Potter and 
thereby constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, the order of the lower 
court denying Century's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
should be reversed and the case remanded to the lower court 
for a trial on the merits. 
DATED this K day of 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
POTTER, LOWELL 
VS 
CENTURY 21 
OTC STOCK TRANSFER 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
TYPE OF HEARING: MOTION HEARING 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. RICHARD J LEEDY 
D. ATTY. 0 ROBERT MEREDITH 
CASE NUMBER 880905981 CV 
DATE 12/02/88 
HONORABLE RICHARD H MOFFAT 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK WWD 
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Richard J. Leedy 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
245 Vine Street, No. 302 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 359-1767 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake Countv Utah 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LOWELL C. POTTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CENTURY 21, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
CivU NoM-O^I 
Judge Richard Moffat 
This matter came on for hearing on the 2nd day of 
December, 1988; it appearing that process was duly served on 
Defendant Century 21 and that more than 20 days have elapsed 
since the service of the Summons and the Verified Complaint; the 
Plaintiff moved for the entry of Default against the Defendant 
Century 21 and requested Judgment in accordance with the prayer 
of the Complaint; the Court entered the Default of the Defendant 
Century 21 and ordered Judgment as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant Century 21 and 
its agent OTC Stock Transfer, acknowledge the two million shares 
of its common stock represented by Certificate No. 11391 and they 
are to transfer the same without restriction in accordance with 
Plaintiff's request. 
It is further ordered that the Plaintiff have Judgment 
against Century 21 for the sum of $90,000 together with interest 
OOOOCi 
at the rate of 18% per annum from February 28, 1986, and attorney 
fees in the amount of $1,500. 
DATED this /5~ day of December, 1988. 
BY THE CQ0RT 
ftfhard Moffa t 
.iTTES'l 
Deputy CierK 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Lowell Potter, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, 
: CASE NO: 880905981 CV 
vs. : 
: JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
Century 21 Mining and OTC Stock Transfer, : 
Defendants. 
The Court having considered the Motion of the defendant Century 21 Mining, to set aside 
the Default Judgment and the memorandum and other pleadings in support and in opposition 
thereto and now being fully advised in the premises makes this its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Motion is denied. The basis, inter alia, is as set forth in the plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion. In particular even assuming as is 
argued, but in the Court's opinion not demonstrated, that the judgment was entered through 
excusable neglect on the part of Counsel for the defendant in order to prevail herein the 
defendant must also file it's Motion to Set Aside in a timely fashion and show that it has a 
meritorious defense. In the Court's opinion neither of the two latter requirements have been 
met. It stretches the Court's imagination to think that a fifteen (15) month period from the date 
of entry of the judgment until a Motion to Set Aside is filed can be deemed to be timely. In this 
circumstance there is no obligation under the rules or the statutes for the party taking the default 
to give notice thereof to the opposition. If in fact the parties had been negotiating as the 
000091 
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defendant claims when a fifteen (15) month hiatus occurs it would seem that the prudent thing 
to do would be to check the file in the clerk's office. Even a simple inquiry of opposing 
Counsel would have elicited a response that the default had been taken. More importantly, no 
meritorious defense was filed with the Motion to Set Aside the Default and any later filing such 
as was done herein on April 4, 1991 only occurred because the previously filed memorandum 
by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendant's Motion pointed out the defect. Under the 
circumstances the Court concludes that there is not sufficient basis to grant the defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside the Default and the same is therefore denied. 
Counsel for the plaintiff will prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this / < day of January, 1993. S : .;'%""' :.- " -
RTchirtfH. Moffat \ ilir^f/ l 
District Court Judge \ %C~^&*J 
' *• S 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following on this •,-" day of January, 1993. 
J. Ray Barrios 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
First American Title Building 
330 East 400 South, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Nathan W. Drage 
Attorney for Defendant 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Nathan W. Drage 
Attorney for Defendant 
2445 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
c:> - * 
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S.-\:.TLAKE COUNTY, 
J. RAY BARRIOS, P.C. (A3915) A/ •''. '•• -rr i\f,\ 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE BUILDING J Deyuty'Cierk 
330 East 400 South, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-3762 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LOWELL POTTER, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
CENTURY 21 MINING, and 
OTC STOCK TRANSFER, ] 
Defendant. 
1 ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
> TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
I Civil No. 880905981 CV 
| Judge Richard H. Moffat 
The Court, having reviewed Defendant's Motion To Set Aside 
Default Judgment and memorandum in support thereof in the above 
captioned case, and having reviewed the Plaintiff#s Opposition to 
said Motion and supporting memorandum, and the matter having 
properly come before the Court pursuant to the Code of Judicial 
Administration, Rule 4-501(1)(d); and the Court having found that 
the Defendant has neither filed it#s motion timely nor presented 
a meritorious defense, and being fully advised in the premises,it 
is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there is not sufficient 
basis to grant Defendant's Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment 
1. 
Ol;0094 
and the Defendant's Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment is 
denied. -JF~* 
Dated this & day of January, 1993. 
BY THELG01 
District Court ^Judge 
O000P5 
TabE 
15 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 5 
by amendment, to be served any time before 
trial; otherwise, the plaintiff in an action 
would be virtually foreclosed from adding addi-
tional defendants after three months. Valley 
Asphalt, Inc. v. Eldon J. Stubbs Constr., Inc., 
714 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1986). 
—Untimeliness. 
Where a summons was dated 38 days later 
than a complaint was filed, but was not placed 
in the hands of a qualified person for service 
until seven months after the complaint was 
filed, the summons was not timely issued. 
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 
Utah 2d 65, 475 P.2d 1005 (1970). 
Amended complaint. 
In wrongful death action filed November 15. 
1973 with no summons issued, filing of 
amended complaint on November 8, 1974 did 
not recommence action, but amended com-
plaint related back to time of original one by 
virtue of Rule 15(c); therefore, since summons 
did not issue within three months of filing o( 
complaint, action was dismissed. Cook v. 
Starkey, 548 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976). 
Waiver. 
If a party appears in court, counterclaims, 
and is partially successful, the party may not 
claim untimely service under Subdivision (b). 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 18 Utah 2d 102, 417 
P.2d 118 (1966). 
Cited in State ex rel. Utah State Dep't of 
Social Servs. v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335 (Utah 
1979); Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053 (Utah 
1987); Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Schultz v. Conger, 755 
P.2d 165 (Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review, — Graham v. Sawaya: 
Utah's Notice Requirements for In Personam 
Actions, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 657. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1988 
Utah L. Rev. 153. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Civil Procedure, 1989 Utah L. 
Rev. 166. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgement in Utah: Gra-
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations 
S 2192 et seq.; 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Cor-
porations, Counties and Other Political Subdi-
visions, § 854; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process § 1 et 
seq.; 68 Am. Jur. 2d Schools $ 21; 72 Am. Jur. 
2d States, Territories, and Dependencies 
$ 126. 
C.J.S. — 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1305 et 
seq.; 20 C.J.S. Counties § 263; 64 C.J.S. Mu-
nicipal Corporations § 2205; 72 CJ.S. Process 
§ 26 et seq.; 79 C.J.S. Schools and School Dis-
tricts $ 436; 81 C.J.S. States § 226. 
A.L.R. — Mistake or error in middle initial 
or middle name of party as vitiating or invali-
dating civil process, summons, or the like, 6 
A.L.R.3d 1179. 
Attorney representing foreign corporation in 
litigation as its agent for service of process in 
unconnected actions or proceedings, 9 A.L.R.3d 
738. 
Civil liability of one making false or fraudu-
lent return of process, 31 A.L.R.3d 1393. 
Construction of phrase "usual place of 
abode,'* or similar terms referring to abode, 
residence, or domicil, as used in statutes relat-
ing to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112. 
Airplane or other aircraft as "motor vehicle" 
or the like within statute providing for con-
structive or substituted service of process on 
nonresident motorist, 36 A.L.R.3d 1387. 
Sunday or holiday, validity of service of sum-
mons or complaint on, 63 A.L.R.3d 423. 
In personam jurisdiction under long-arm 
statute of nonresident banking institution, 9 
A.L.R.4th 661. 
In personam or territorial jurisdiction of 
state court in connection with obscenity prose-
cution of author, actor, photographer, pub-
lisher, distributor, or other party whose acts 
were performed outside the state, 16 A.L.R.4th 
1318. 
Forum state's jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendant in action based on obscene or threat-
ening telephone call from out of state, 37 
A.L.R.4th 852. 
Necessity and permissibility of raising claim 
for abuse of process by reply or counterclaim in 
same proceeding in which abuse occurred — 
state cases, 82 A.L.R.4th 1115. 
Key Numbers. — Corporations *» 507; 
Counties *» 219; Municipal Corporations «» 
1029; Process «=> 21, 23, 24, 50 to 58, 63, 64, 82, 
84 to 111, 127 to 153; 161 to 165; Schools and 
School Districts «=» 119; States «=» 204. 
Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, 
every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to 
the original complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous 
defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a 
party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one 
which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, 
offer of judgment, notice of signing or entry of judgment under Rule 58A(d), 
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No service need be 
made on parties in default for failure to appear except as provided in Rule 
55(a)(2) (default proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims 
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for relief against them which shall be served upon them in the manner pro-
vided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, attach-
ment, garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is named 
as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, 
claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or posses-
sion of the property at the time of its seizure. 
(b) Service: How made. 
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be 
made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made 
upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the 
court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by deliver-
ing a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his known address or, if no 
address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery of a 
copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the party; or 
leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof; or, 
if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if 
the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at his 
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon 
mailing. 
(2) A resident attorney, on whom pleadings and other papers may be 
served, shall be associated as attorney of record with any foreign attorney 
practicing in any of the courts of this state. 
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there are un-
usually large numbers of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own 
initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and re-
plies thereto need not be made as between the defendants and that any cross-
claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative de-
fense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other 
parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the 
plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order 
shall be served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs. 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a 
party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable 
time thereafter, but the court may upon motion of a party or on its own 
initiative order that depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents, re-
quests for admission, and answers and responses thereto not be filed unless on 
order of the court or for use in the proceeding. 
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers 
with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with 
the clerk of the court, except that the judge may permit the papers to be filed 
with him, in which event he shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith 
transmit them to the office of the clerk, if any. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 5td) is 
amended to give the trial court the option, ei-
ther on an ad hoc basis or by local rule, of or-
dering that discovery papers, depositions, writ-
ten interrogatories, document requests, re-
quests for admission, and answers and re-
sponses need not be filed unless required for 
specific use in the case. The committee is of the 
view that a local rule of the district courts on 
the subject should be encouraged. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 5, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — How civil action com-
menced, U.R.C.P. 3(a). 
Service by mail, additional time after, 
U.R.C.P. 6(e). 
Third-party practice, U.R.C.P. 14. 
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500 P.~d 550 <Utah L979); Myers v. Morgan, 
626 P-2d 410 (Utah 1981); Bernard v. 
Attebury. 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981); Bailey v. 
Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 19*84); 
GMAC V. Martinez, 712 P.2d 243 (Utah 1986); 
Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806 (Utah 1986); 
Owen v. Owen, 734 P.2d 414 (Utah 1986); 
Tebbs. Smith & Assocs. v. Brooks, 735 P.2d 
1305 (Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92 
(Utah 1986); Freegard v. First W. Nat'l Bank, 
738 P.2d 614 (Utah 1987); Crosiand v. Peck, 
738 P.2d 631 (Utah 1987); Elder v. Triax Co., 
740 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1987); Mascaro v. Davis, 
741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Payne ex rel. Payne 
v. Mvers, 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987); McKee v. 
Williams. 741 P.2d 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 
Galloway v. Mangum, 744 P.2d 1365 (Utah 
1987); Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); Kathy's Food Stores, Inc. v. Equi-
table Life & Cas.'lns. Co., 753 P.2d 501 (Utah 
1988); Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 
P.2d 41 (Utah 1988); OK Motors, Inc. v. Hill. 
762 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Redevel-
opment Agency v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Wade v. Burke. 800 P.2d 
1106 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); City Consumer 
Serv., Inc. v. Peters. 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991); 
Cornish Town v. Kolier, 817 P.2d 305 (Utah 
1991); Town of Manila v. Broadbent Land Co., 
818 P.2d 2 (Utah 1991); Peterson v. Peterson, 
818 P.2d 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Quinn v. 
Quinn, 830 P.2d 282 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 
858 (Utah 1992); Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); J.H. ex rel. D.H. v. West 
Vallev Citv, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Multiple 
Claims Under Rule 54(b): A Time for Reexami-
nation?, 1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 327. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and 
Error § 1009 et seq.; 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs 
§§ 14, 26 to 36, 87 et seq.; 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judg-
ments § 1. 
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 46 to 
166; 20 C.J.S. Costs § 1 et seq.; 49 C.J.S. Judg-
ments § 1. 
A.L.R. — Attorney's personal liability for 
expenses incurred in relation to services for cli-
ent. 15 A.L.R.3d 531; 66 A.L.R.4th 256. 
Effect on compensation of architect or build-
ing contractor of express provision in private 
building contract limiting the cost of the build-
ing, 20 A.L.R.3d 778. 
Recoverability under property insurance or 
insurance against liability for property dam-
age of insured's expenses to prevent or miti-
gate damages, 33 A.L.R.3d 1262. 
Dismissal of plaintiffs action as entitling de-
fendant to recover attorney's fees or costs as 
"prevailing partv" or "successful party," 66 
A.L.R.3d 1087. 
Who is the "successful party" or "prevailing 
party" for purposes of awarding costs where 
both parties prevail on affirmative claims, 66 
A.L.R.3d 1115. 
Continuance of civil case as conditioned 
upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses 
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144. 
Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative 
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by 
these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his 
default. 
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the default of any 
party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be neces-
sary to give such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken 
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as provided in Rule 
5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of damages of the 
nondefaulting party. 
Running of interest on judgment where both 
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099. 
Allocation of defense costs between primary 
and excess insurance carriers, 19 A.L.R.4th 
107. 
Authority of trial judge to impose costs or 
other sanctions against attorney who fails to 
appear at, or proceed with, scheduled trial. 29 
A.L.R.4th 160. 
Allowance of attorneys' fees in mandamus 
proceedings, 34 A.L.R.4th 457. 
Retrospective application and effect of state 
statute or rule allowing interest or changing 
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41 
A.L.R.4th 694. 
Obduracy as basis for state-court award of 
attorneys' fees, 49 A.L.R.4th 825. 
Modern status of state court rules governing 
entry of judgment on multiple claims, 80 
A.L.R.4th 707. 
Recoverability of cost of computerized legal 
research under 28 USC § 1920 or Rule 54(d), 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 A.L.R. 
Fed. 168. 
Modern status of Federal Civil Procedure 
Rule 54(b) governing entry of judgment on 
multiple claims, 89 A.L.R. Fed. 514. 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=> 24 to 
135; Costs <*=» 78 et seq., 195 et seq., 221 et seq.; 
Judgment *=» 1. 
(b) Judgment . Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for 
a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served otherwise than by publica-
tion or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request of 
the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs against 
the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is 
not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by 
default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to 
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account 
or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any 
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, 
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems 
necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this 
rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, 
a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counter-
claim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 
54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judg-
ment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer 
or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief 
by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 55, F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Damages. 
Divorce action. 
Failure to plead. 
Judgment. 
—Conduct of counsel. 
—Default entry necessary. 
—Failure to follow rule. 
—Hearing on merits. 
—Punitive damages. 
Notice. 
Setting aside default. 
—Collateral attack. 
—Direct attack. 
—Discretion of court. 
—Grounds. 
Excusable neglect. 
—Judicial attitude. 
—Movant's duty. 
—Setting aside proper. 
Time for appeal. 
Cited. 
Damages. 
A default judgment establishes, as a matter 
of law, that defendants are liable to plaintiff as 
to each cause of action alleged in the com-
plaint. Nevertheless, it is still incumbent upon 
the nondefaulting party to establish by compe-
tent evidence the amount of recoverable dam-
ages and costs he claims. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
There is no right to a jury trial on the issue 
of damages once default has been entered. 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Divorce action. 
Defendant who failed to file answer in di-
vorce action was not entitled to hearing or no-
tice before entry of default divorce decree even 
though 90-day statutory period had not 
elapsed. Heath v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1975). 
Failure to plead. 
In an action for modification of the custody 
provision in a divorce decree, it was appropri-
ate for the trial court to rule on appellee's peti-
tion, absent any responsive pleading, and to 
accept the allegations in the petition as true in 
resolving the threshold requirement of 
whether appellant's circumstances had materi-
ally changed; however, it does not follow that 
appellee's petition entitled her to relief. A trial 
court asked to render a judgment by default 
must first conclude that the uncontroverted al-
legations of an applicant's petition are, on their 
face, legally sufficient to establish a valid 
claim against the defaulting party. Stevens v. 
Collard, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
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State Retirement Office v. Salt Lake County, P.2d 1083 (Utah 1990); Alford v. Utah League 
780 P.2d 813 (Utah 1989); Donahue v. Durfee, of Cities & Towns. 791 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 
780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Territorial 1990); Govert Copier Painting v. Van 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Ct. App. 1989); G. Adams Ltd. Partnership v. Gate City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dalton, 
Durbano, 782 P.2d 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991); City Consumer 
Chapman ex rel. Chapman v. Primary Chil- Serv., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991); 
dren's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989); Yoho Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991); 
Automotive. Inc. v. Shillington, 784 P.2d 1253 Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Kirk v. Division of Occu-
414 (Utah 1990); Butterfield ex rel. Butterfield pational & Professional Licensing, 815 P.2d 
v. Okubo, 790 P.2d 94 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Johnson v. Morton 
Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct. Thiokol. Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991); Hill v. 
App. 1990); Village Inn Apts. v. State Farm Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 
Fire & Cas. Co.. 790 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
1990); Madsen v. United Television, Inc.. 797 Co., 840 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Attorneys' Fees in Dead num's statute, use of evidence exclude 
Utah. 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553. able under, to defeat or support summary judg-
Note, The Movant's Burden in a Motion for ment, 67 A.L.R.3d 970. 
Summary Judgment. 1987 Utah L. Rev. 731. Liability in tort for interference with physi-
Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Summary
 cian>s contract or relationship with hospital, 7 
Judgment §§ 16 to 19, 26 to 36, 41 to 44.
 A ^ R 4 t h S 7 2 
C.J.S. - 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 219 to 227. Admissibility of oral testimony at state sum-
A £ * R ' 7 k P r o c e e d m ^ 5 o r summary judgment j u d g m e n t hearing, 53 A.L.R.4th 527. 
rL^ld 6 136 y i P r e S e counterclaim, 8
 S u f f i c i e n c y o f e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t g r m t rf 
Reviewability of order denving motion for s u m ^ judgment in will probate or contest 
summary judgment, 15 A.L.R.3d 899. proceedings. 53 A.L.R.4th o61. 
Right to voluntarv dismissal of civil action Necessity of oral argument on motion for 
as affected by opponent's motion for summary su^mary judgment or judgment on pleadings 
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di- i n federal court, 105 A.L.R. Fed 755. 
rected verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. K*y Numbers. — Judgment «=» 178 to 190. 
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments. 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 33 
of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right 
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner 
provided in Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another adequate remedy does 
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. 
The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment 
and may advance it on the calendar. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 57, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Oil Shale Corp. v. Larson, 20 Utah 
2d 369, 438 P.2d 540 (1968). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 22A Am. Jur. 2d Declara- declaratory relief in state court, 33 A.L.R.4th 
tory Judgments §§ 183. 186, 203 et seq. 146. 
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments Key Numbers. — Declaratory Judgment **> 
§§ 17, 18, 104, 155. 41, 42, 251, 367. 
A.L.R. — Right to jury trial in action for 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise 
directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict 
of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there is a special 
verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories re-
turned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate 
judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
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(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof 
and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judg-
ment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all 
purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is 
signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall immediately make 
a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The prevailing party shall 
promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties 
and shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court. How-
ever, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice require-
ment of this provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or 
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may neverthe-
less be rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is au-
thorized by statute, the party seeking the same must file with the clerk of the 
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the 
defendant, to the following effect: 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it 
shall concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the 
plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the 
judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the amount confessed, with costs 
of entry, if any. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph 
(d) is intended to remedy the difficulties sug-
gested by Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 14 
Utah 2d 334, 384 P.2d 109 (1963). 
Compiler's Notes. — The subject matter of 
this rule is dealt with in Rules 58 and 79(a), 
F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Death of party. 
—During appeal. 
Other cases. 
—Unsigned minute entry. 
When entered. 
—Completion. 
Formal judgment. 
Notice to parties. 
—Filing. 
—Unsigned minute entry. 
Cited. 
Death of party. 
—During appeal. 
Where jury returned verdict for plaintiff but 
judge entered judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict for defendant, death of plaintiff during 
appeal did not abate appeal since court, under 
Subdivision (e) of this rule, could still enter 
judgment on verdict if judgment notwithstand-
ing verdict were reversed. Bates v. Burns, 2 
Utah 2d 362. 274 P.2d 569 (1954). 
Cross-References. — Judgment against 
person dying after verdict or decision, not a 
lien on realty, § 78-22-1.1. 
Judgment by confession authorized, § 78-22-
3. 
Other cases. 
—Unsigned minute entry. 
An appeal from a summary judgment was 
dismissed where the record showed only an 
unsigned minute entry and no judgment or or-
der signed by the judge. Wisden v. City of 
Salina, 696 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985). 
When entered. 
—Completion. 
—-Formal judgment. 
Whether plaintiff had right to have action 
dismissed upon payment of costs presented ju-
dicial question to be determined by court, so 
that where court ordered case dismissed and 
clerk entered "case dismissed" in register of 
actions but formal judgment had not been en-
tered, action was still pending between parties. 
Yusky v. Chief Consol. Mining Co., 65 Utah 
269, 236 P. 452 (1925). 
Notice to parties. 
Under this rule, a judgment is complete and 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Cited in National Farmers Union Property 
& Cas. Co. v. Thompson. 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 
249 <1955»: Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435. 
326 P.2d 722 (1958): Howard v. Howard. 11 
Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275 (I960); NunJey v. 
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc.. 15 Utah 2d 126, 
388 P.2d 798 (1964): Hanson v. General Bldrs. 
Supply Co., 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61 
(1964): James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964); Porcupine Reservoir 
Co. v. Llovd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318, 
392 P.2d 620 (1964); Watson v. Anderson, 29 
Utah 2d 36. 504 P.2d 1003 (1973): Nichols v. 
State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976); Edgar v. 
Wagner. 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Time Com. 
Fin. Corp. v. Bnmhall, 575 P.2d 701 (Utah 
1978); Anderton v. Montgomery. 607 P.2d 828 
(Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 
622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981): Mulherin v. Inger-
soll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); 
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 
198D: Pozzolan Portland Cement Co. v. Gard-
ner, 668 P.2d 569 (Utah 1983i; Nelson v. 
Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); Golden 
Kev Realty. Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 
1985): Estate of Kay. 705 P.2d 1165 (Utah 
1985); York v. Unqualified Washington 
County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679 (Utah 
1986); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 
1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318 
(Utah 1987»: Walker v. Carlson. 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Paryzek v. Parvzek. 776 P.2d 78 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989): Alired v. Allred. 835 P.2d 974 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial 
§S 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §5 13 et seq., 
115. 116, 122 to 127. 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set-
tlement of civil case. 6 A.L.R.3d 1457. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil 
case. 7 A.L.R.3d 1000. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in 
which they are written. 10 A.L.R.3d 501. 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem-
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 
A.LJUd 1101. 
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor-
nev, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 
A.L.R.3d 126. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
civil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded by parties. 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Court reporter's death or disability prior to 
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
new trial. 57 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
damages for personal injury to or death of sea-
man in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
modern cases. 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
ages for personal injury or death in actions un-
der Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS 
§§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases. 97 A.L.R. Fed. 
189. 
Key Numbers. — New Trial c» 13 et seq., 
110, 116. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
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(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), i2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation./This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relievr-a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60. F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion 
to set aside judgment. § 21-1-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Any other reason justifying relief.* 
—Default judgment. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Real party in interest. 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion. 
Default judgment. 
Effect of set-aside judgment. 
—Admissions. 
Fraud. 
—Divorce action. 
Form of motion. 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree. 
—Fraud or duress. 
-—Motion distinguished. 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. 
—Default judgment. 
Illness. 
Inconvenience. 
• Merits of claim. 
• Negligence of attorney. 
No claim for relief. 
—Delayed motion for new trial. 
—Failure to file cost bill. 
—Failure to file notice of appeal. 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
—Trial court's discretion. 
—Unemployment compensation appeal. 
—Workmen's compensation appeal. 
Newiy discovered evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Discretion not abused. 
Procedure. 
—Notice to parties. 
Res judicata. 
Reversal of judgment. 
—Invalidation of sale. 
Satisfaction, release or discharge. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
—Discharging representative of estate from 
further demand. 
—Erroneously included damages. 
—Prospective application of judgment. 
Timeliness of motion. 
—Confused mental condition of party. 
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution. 
—Fraud. 
—Invalid service. 
—Judicial error. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect. 
—Newly discovered evidence. 
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption. 
—"Reasonable time.** 
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion. 
—Satisfaction. 
Unauthorized appearance. 
Void judgment. 
—Basis. 
—Lack of jurisdiction. 
Cited. 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
Subdivision (7) embodies three require-
ments: First, that the reason be one other than 
tho*e listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); sec-
ond, that the reason justify relief; and third, 
that the motion be made within a reasonable 
time Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 65? 
P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delben 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. Apo. 
1991). 


